by

Nicolas Pouvreau-Monti

“Algerians should have visas valid for 132 years in France.” These words were uttered by Abdelmadjid Tebboune in the interview he gave Le Figaro on December 29, 2022.[i] With this statement, the Algerian president sought to reframe the migratory relationship with France within a familiar mental framework: that of colonial guilt—alluding to the length of France’s presence in Algeria, viewed unilaterally as genocidal oppression. In doing so, he also gave an idea of how this relationship is viewed by the Algerian regime and, to a significant extent, within the diaspora: Algerian immigration to France is seen as a “due”, a compensatory counterpart to colonization that does not imply any form of reciprocity in the efforts made.

The high tension between the governments of the two countries has been evident since the beginning of 2025. It flared up in the context of Algiers’ refusal to admit its nationals deported as irregular migrants from France[ii] (including—or especially—the most dangerous among them), the retaliatory measures threatened by Paris, and the imprisonment of Boualem Sansal[iii]: all of this seems to keep bringing us back to the colonial question. In particular, the memory of the eight tragic years of conflict that preceded independence in 1962 is being invoked unabashedly by those who urge our leaders not to “start the Algerian war again” by taking what they consider an excessively firm stance towards the Algerian regime.

A few months before the “Red All Saints’ Day” of 1954, which marked the beginning of hostilities in the French territories of Algeria, another terrible conflict had come to an end, one that had lasted nine years and claimed more—probably twice as many—victims than the Algerian conflict would subsequently produce: the Indochina War. Immigrants from Algeria are now the largest immigrant population in France. However, for three decades, our country also received significant immigration from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The comparative trajectories of these two waves of immigration, from Algeria and “Southeast Asia” (to use the INSEE category[iv]), deserve to be viewed in parallel, as their shared colonial background contrasts sharply with their extremely heterogeneous integration dynamics.

Chronologically, migration flows from Algeria were the first to arrive in mainland France in significant numbers, in the 1950s. The number of Algerian immigrants increased tenfold between 1946 and 1954, reaching 350,000 by the time of independence in 1962.[v] Contrary to a view often put forward in public debate, this influx contributed little to the “reconstruction” of the country (which was completed in 1951, at a time when colonial workers represented less than 1% of the country’s population). The start of Algerian immigration should be seen in the context of the proactive priority given to Algerians by the French government, the economic and social crisis affecting Algeria (where production, particularly agricultural production, was not keeping pace with rapid population growth), and, of course, the labor needs of a French economy in the midst of rapid expansion (up to 8% growth per year).

The flow of immigrants did not dry up with independence. There were 555,000 Algerian immigrants in 1975, at a major turning point in the history of immigration. After the first oil crisis in 1973, which marked the end of the Trente Glorieuses (the thirty glorious years of economic growth in France), labor immigration was officially suspended on July 3, 1974. However, family reunification provided for by the decree[vi] of April 29, 1976—and the specific provisions applicable to Algerians under the agreement of December 27, 1968—led to a continuation of migration flows, which changed in nature: no longer primarily economic, but primarily family-based. This reality still holds true for Algerian immigration today: in 2024[vii], residence permits for family reasons accounted for 55% of the first permits granted to Algerian nationals, twice the average for all nationalities (27%). Conversely, first permits for work reasons accounted for only 9% of the total for this nationality (compared to 17% on average).

The impact of this disproportion is all the more striking given that France alone grants two-thirds of all initial residence permits issued to Algerians throughout the European Union. Algeria remains the main nationality benefiting from the stock of valid residence permits. Half of the immigrants from Algeria living in the country in 2023 arrived after 2000. In total, the Algerian diaspora in France can be estimated at 2.1 million people over two generations (at least 2.7 million including the third generation).

The historical trajectory of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian immigration to France appears quite different. Between 1954—the date of the signing of the Geneva Accords that ended the Indochina War—and 1965, an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Indochinese repatriates settled in France, most of them from mixed marriages between French soldiers and Indochinese women, but also from auxiliary staff in the French army and administration. This was followed by fifteen years of instability in the region, marked by armed conflict and the rise to power of communist dictatorships: Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and their genocidal atrocities in Cambodia, the Pathet Lao in Laos, the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, the war between Vietnam and Cambodia, and so on.

These bloody upheavals led France to welcome large numbers of what were known as “boat people”: it became their primary refuge in Europe and the second largest in the world, behind the United States, taking in around 130,000 refugees.[viii] These flows continued into the 1980s, with a significant economic dimension to these migratory dynamics due to the gap between living standards at departure and arrival. In total, the number of immigrants from Southeast Asia to France increased ninefold between 1968 and 1990.[ix] The economic liberalization of these countries and their entry into a dynamic of development led to a slowdown in migration flows from the late 1990s onwards.

In 2023, the population of Southeast Asian origin in France numbered 153,000 immigrants (77,000 from Vietnam, 48,000 from Cambodia, 29,000 from Laos) and 185,000 second-generation descendants of immigrants, making a total diaspora of around 340,000 people.[x] In reality, migration flows from Southeast Asia have stabilized: only 25% of immigrants from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have arrived in France since 2000, compared to 58% for all immigrants from the (vast) Asian continent. None of the three countries concerned were among the top 20 countries of origin for first residence permits issued in 2021 (according to the latest data available broken down by nationality).[xi] Only 152 first asylum applications were filed by applicants from Southeast Asia in 2023.[xii]

Beyond the obvious quantitative asymmetry between the Algerian and Southeast Asian diasporas in France, other, qualitative differences are emerging between these two groups of immigrants, both sometimes referred to as “post-colonial.” Whether we look at economic, social, educational, or cultural indicators, the findings are striking: while immigration from Southeast Asia appears to outperform in most of these areas, Algerian immigration symbolically sums up all the problems and challenges associated with current migration policies.

Among the first generation of immigrants in the strict sense (people born abroad), the average level of qualification of both populations appears to be much lower than that of the non-immigrant population: 44% of immigrants from Southeast Asia living in France have no qualifications or only a CEP certificate, as do 38% of immigrants from Algeria, compared with 13.5% of people without direct immigrant ancestry.[xiii]

Surprisingly, however, there are already significant disparities in labor market integration[xiv]: the unemployment rate among Algerian immigrants is four times higher than that of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian immigrants (13.5% versus 3.2%). The latter was even half that of people without a migrant background (6.5%)! Conversely, the employment rate among immigrants from Southeast Asia—i.e., the proportion of people of working age who are actually in employment—is almost 20 percentage points higher than that of immigrants from Algeria: 75% compared to 56%.

This economic integration is all the more remarkable given that these immigrants from Southeast Asia often lack knowledge of the French language: 48% of them had no command of French upon their arrival in France (2019-2020 data); 49% had no oral skills, 51% had no reading skills in French, and the same proportion had no writing skills.[xv]

However, within a single generation, populations originating from Southeast Asia have gone from having the lowest scores to the highest scores in terms of educational attainment—despite coming from families with lower levels of education and less proficiency in French.[xvi] Only 6.6% of the descendants of Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian immigrants who completed their initial studies have no qualifications or only completed elementary school education, which is the lowest rate among all migrant backgrounds, nearly three times lower than the average for all descendants of immigrants (17%) and even twice as low as the rate for people who are neither immigrants nor descendants of immigrants (13.5%). On the contrary, 38% of them have a degree higher than the post-secondary Bac+2 certificate; this is significantly higher than the average for descendants of immigrants (25.6%) and even for people without a migrant background (27%). Not unrelated to this spectacular academic success, the unemployment rate among descendants of immigrants from Southeast Asia is the lowest among all non-European migrant backgrounds, at 5.6%.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the integration trajectory of the descendants of Algerian immigrants. Twenty-seven percent of them have no more than a middle school diploma—four times more than among the children of immigrants from Southeast Asia. Only 18% have a diploma higher than a two-year college degree, half that of the aforementioned category. Their employment rate is 49%, almost 20 points below the average for the general population (68%). The unemployment rate is 14.7%—even higher than that of immigrants in the strict sense of the term from the same origin (people born Algerian in Algeria).

So what accounts for the academic success of the Vietnamese and Cambodian “second generation”? One explanation stands out quite clearly: the family model. As demographer Gérard-François Dumont sums it up:

The successful integration of immigrant children can only happen if the family environment acts as a catalyst. If the father is authoritarian towards his wife but fails to exercise authority over his children, the chances of integration are slim. Some family types are harmful, while others are positive.” In Vietnamese households, “the family places education and academic performance at the center of its concerns. As a result, it proves to be a remarkable melting pot for integration.”[xvii]

This approach appears to be part of a broader trend of great trust in the institutions of the host society.

Logically, such contrasting economic and educational profiles imply a highly differentiated use of collective solidarity mechanisms and public spending, particularly social spending. The example of housing conditions is illuminating in this regard.[xviii] In 2019-2020, 49% of Algerian immigrants in France lived in social housing, compared with 44% of descendants of immigrants from the same origin, four times more than among people without a migrant background (11%). Among the Southeast Asian diaspora, this proportion was only 14% for the first generation and 13% for the second. Conversely, 61% of immigrants from Southeast Asia lived in a home they owned, a record rate among all people of migrant origins. This proportion was only 22% among Algerian immigrants and 33% among their descendants, compared to 53% in the general population.

In his 2024 study on non-European foreigners and social housing, senior civil servant Michel Aubouin summarizes the different strategies:

While French households live in public housing because they cannot afford to buy their own homes, or do so on a temporary basis (young couples, for example), families from the Maghreb (Algeria and Morocco) consider this type of housing to be a right. This is largely due to the relationships that many of them continue to maintain with their country of origin. While the former seek to build up real estate assets to escape the pressure of collective housing, the latter invest in a second home ‘back home’ which, in a way, illustrates their success.[xix]

Correlating with these economic and social disparities, indicators of the “cultural” integration of these two populations vary significantly. While this dimension may seem less directly quantifiable than economic or social integration, several metrics nevertheless allow it to be measured fairly reliably. One such metric is the link maintained with the country of origin.[xx] In 2019-2020, 95% of immigrants from Algeria aged 18 to 59 had visited their country of origin at least once since arriving in France, as had 74% of the descendants of immigrants; these rates were 70% and 43% among the population originating from Southeast Asia, i.e., twenty-five points lower.

Marital choices are also a valuable indicator for analysis. The descendants of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian immigrants form the least endogamous group of non-European origin: only 14% of descendants of two immigrant parents from Southeast Asia live with a spouse of the same origin, compared to an average of 35% for all descendants of immigrants—and 55% of descendants of Algerian immigrants.

This comparison of two groups of immigrants from the former French Empire, with radically different integration trajectories, attests to an obvious fact: the colonial period is not an unavoidable determining factor in this matter. Its systematic invocation by the Algerian regime and some of its citizens to legitimize a logic of “entitlement” in migration matters cannot be accepted by French public opinion or leaders.

More broadly, these findings point to the potential benefits for France of regaining control over a larger part of its migration policy—beyond the professional and student immigration that it currently controls—including the choice of geographical origins of immigration. It could then be conducted in the same way as all other public policies, guided by a rational objective: to minimize costs and maximize benefits for both French society and the French economy.

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